In this correspondence, we study quantum communication in the presence of adversarial noise. In this setting, communicating with perfect fidelity requires a quantum code of bounded minimum distance, for which the best known rates are given by the quantum Gilbert-Varshamov (QGV) bound. Asking only for arbitrarily high fidelity and letting the sender and reciever use a secret key of length logarithmic in the number of qubits sent, we find a dramatic improvement over the QGV rates. In fact, our protocols allow high fidelity transmission at noise levels for which perfect fidelity is impossible. To achieve such rates, we introduce fully quantum list codes, which may be of independent interest.
I. INTRODUCTION
Effectively dealing with noise is a major challenge faced by all proposals for the coherent manipulation of quantum information. Besides communication, sending a quantum state over a noisy channel models noisy storage, and as such, characterizing communication rates for quantum channels is a central question in the study of both quantum information and computation.
Various asymptotic capacities of quantum channels have been studied [1] - [11] . However, this work has been almost exclusively concerned with discrete memoryless channels (DMCs), wherein a sender and receiver use many independent and identical copies of a channel. In this scenario, one studies the asymptotic communication rate possible using an operation of the form N n , where N is the channel under consideration and the rate is R = k=n where k is the number of high fidelity logical qubits sent. Relatively little is known outside of the DMC scenario, with notable exceptions found in [12] - [16] .
In this paper, we study an adversarial quantum channel (AQC), which is perhaps as different from a DMC as one can imagine. When sending n qubits over an AQC, instead of errors on different qubits occuring independently, an adversary who knows what protocol is being used tries to foil the communication by maliciously choosing a superposition of errors, subject only to a restriction on the number of qubits each error affects. We call this channel N adv p;n , where p is the fraction of qubits the adversary is allowed to corrupt. N adv p;n is the natural quantum generalization of the classical adversarial channel that was considered in [17] , [18] and whose roots go back to [19] . Manuscript [20] , where logarithms are taken base 2 here and throughout. Communication beyond this rate is possible only if QECCs beating the Gilbert-Varshamov bound exist, which is a question that has been quite difficult to resolve. Furthermore, Rains has shown [21] , [22] that no quantum code can have distance greater than n(3 0 p 3)=4 0:317n, so that it is impossible to send even a single qubit for p (3 0 p 3)=8 0:158.
However, if we ask only for a high fidelity reconstruction, and allow the sender and receiver to share a secret key of size O(log n) it is possible to communicate at rates much higher than the Gilbert-Varshamov and Rains bounds suggest. Below, we present a coding strategy for this scenario with a rate of 10H(p)0p log 3, which is significantly larger than the Gilbert-Varshamov rate for all values of p and remains nonzero up to p 0:189. Our rate equals the best communication rate via the depolarizing channel (in the DMCs scenario) of error probability p using only nondegenerate codes.
There are three ingredients in achieving such rates with negligible length secret keys. The first is a predetermined quantum list code that is known to the adversary. This alone allows high-rate but low-fidelity transmission. To improve the fidelity, a random subcode is further chosen according to a secret key unknown to the adversary. Finally, the subcode is derandomized using small-biased sets.
Before explaining the construction of our code, we first discuss some intuition on why the code works and how resources are being reduced. Informally, a quantum list code is an error correcting code with the relaxed reconstruction requirement that the decoded state be equal to the original state acted on by a superposition of a small number of errors. We call the number of errors the "list length." This relaxation allows a considerable increase in rate over QECCs, and by a random coding argument we show there are list codes with constant-length lists and rates approaching 10H(p)0p log 3 that tolerate pn errors. To distinguish between the errors in the list and communicate with high fidelity, the sender and receiver select a large subcode of the list code using a secret key. In particular, this can be chosen pseudorandomly by using O(log n) bits of secret key.
We can interpret our code as a set of (parity) check conditions that yield syndrome information. Most of these conditions are used in listdecoding and can be known to the adversary, and the rest of the conditions are pseudorandom and with high probability are capable of completely distinguishing the errors on the list. Note that there are simpler constructions using randomness unknown to the adversary, and we now make a comparison. The first construction is simply a random (nondegenerate) quantum error correcting code achieving the same rate but requiring O(n 2 ) bits of secret key 1 . Second, one could use a secret permutation of the n qubits in the AQC turning the adversarial channel to something very similar to n depolarizing DMC's of error p in the DMC's setting [24] , [15] . The best known rate is similar to ours (but slightly better for large p) but the cost will be O(n log n) bits of key, which, unfortunately, still gives a divergent key rate. Third, the standard derandomizing technique of key recycling cannot be used in a straightforward way in the current, adversarial, context. Thus, our hybrid construction involving a known list-code and a pseudorandom subcode demonstrates what type of randomness is unnecessary, and can be seen as a method to derandomize other key-inefficient protocols, achieving the same task with a much shorter key.
For the rest of the paper, we summarize related works, review background material, present the details of our construction, after which we discuss various applications and open problems.
Related work
Approximate error correction was studied in [25] to reduce the block length (and thus improving the rate) for a more specific error model. Success criterion and algebraic sufficient conditions were given. Reference [26] provided an information theoretic approximate error correction criterion. The approximation in these works stems from a relaxed decoding procedure. Much closer to our work is [27] (in the context of quantum secret sharing) that used a randomized code to maximize the distance with high probability but the rate is low (of lesser concern in that context). Our construction was inspired by that in [17] in the classical setting. Further comparisons between our work and these earlier results and insights obtained will be discussed in Section V.
After the initial presentation of this result [28] , we learned of two independent studies of list codes, both in settings quite different from our own. Reference [29] studied decoding of classical list codes with quantum algorithms, and [30] studied list codes for sending classical messages via iid quantum channels.
II. BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS
Our sender, receiver, and adversary will be named Alice, Bob, and Eve, respectively. The encoding of a k-qubit state j i into a QECC will be written as j i. We call the Pauli group acting on n qubits G n and write its elements in the form P = i t X u Z v , where t 2 f0; 1; 2; 3g; u; v are binary vectors of length n; X u (Z v ) denotes X u 111 X u (Z v 111 Z v ); X = 0 1 1 0 and Z = 1 0 0 01 . The (anti)commutation relation between P1; P2 2 Gn is determined by P1P2 = (01) !(P ;P ) P2P1 with !(P 1 ; P 2 ) = u 1 1 v 2 + u 2 1 v 1 , where the dot products and sum are computed in arithmetic modulo two. We let hP l i denote the subgroup of Gn generated by a set of Pauli elements fP l g.
A state j i is said to be stabilized by a Pauli matrix P when P j i = j i. An [n; k] stabilizer code is a 2 k -dimensional space of n-qubit states simultaneously stabilized by all elements of a size 2 n0k Abelian subgroup of G n . The abelian subgroup is typically called S and is referred to as the code's stabilizer, and has n0k generators denoted by
For any E 2 G n we refer to the (n0k)-bit string !(E; S i )
as the syndrome of E [20] , [31] . The weight of a Pauli matrix P , which we denote by wt(P ), is the number of qubits on which P acts nontrivially, and we call a stabilizer code an [n; k; d] code if it can detect all errors outside of S of weight less than the distance d, which is equivalent to being able to correct all errors of weight less than b(d01)=2c. satisfies E y i E j 6 2 N (S) 0 S. Intuitively, it means that the syndrome can be used to identify all errors of concern up to a multiplicative factor that is in S and has no effect on the codespace.
We state a property of the Pauli group that will be useful later. For any subgroup G of G n , for any set s of i independent elements in G, and a specific (ordered) list of i (anti)commutation relations with elements of s, exactly jGj=2 0i elements of G will satisfy those relations. (1) subject to the requirement that i A y i Ai = I and where E np = fE 2 G n jwt(E) png is as defined before. The particular choice of the fA i g's is made by Eve only after Alice and Bob have decided on a communication strategy.
Notice that to communicate effectively over N adv p;n one must find a strategy that works with high fidelity for all channels described by (1) . To do this, we will use quantum list codes, which are defined below.
Definition 2:
We say that an [n; k] stabilizer code, C, is an [n; k; t; L]-list code if there is a decoding operation, D, such that for every E i 2 E t and j 2 C, the decoded k-qubit state, along with the syndrome s, is given by D(E i j ih jE y i ) = is a list of logical errors on the codespace and hP s l i L l=1 is the group they generate.
Note that in the above definition, the set fP s l g L l=1 generating the error list depends on the syndrome s.
III. QUANTUM LIST CODES
We now show that, asymptotically, there exist [n; k; t; L]-list codes with favorable parameters. We proceed by considering random stabilizer codes, arguing along the lines of [23] and [20] . In particular, we will show that if we choose a random stabilizer code with rate as below, in the limit of large n the probability of it failing to be L-list decodable is less than 1. 
Proof: Let N E = jE pn j and E pn = fE i g N i=1 . Since two errors E i and E j have the same syndrome iff E y i E j 2 N(S), a code will fail to be L-list decodable only if there are L + 1 independent errors E 0 ; . . . ; E L outside of S having the same syndrome. Mathematically, this means E y i E j 2 N(S) for 0 i; j L (or equivalently, E y 0 E j 2 N(S) for 1 j L). The proof consists of two steps: (1) bounding the probability (over the code) for a fixed list of L independent Pauli matrices to be in N(S), and (2) taking the union bound over all such possible lists to show that list-decoding will fail with probability (over the code) strictly less than 1. Thus, the desired list code must exist.
Step (1) is essentially a counting argument. How many ways can we choose n0k stabilizer generators S 1 ; S 2 ; . . . S n0k ? Here we omit overall factors of 61;i, but we count different generating sets (for the same code) and different orderings. 2 There are two constraints for the generating set, commutivity and independence. S 1 can be chosen from any of the 2 2n 01 nontrivial Pauli matrices. Recall the property of G n stated in the previous section. S2 can be chosen from the 2 2n01 Pauli matrices commuting with S 1 but must be chosen from outside of the multiplicative group generated by S 1 , thus there are 2 2n01 02 choices. 2 Our analysis revolves around random stabilizer generators rather than random codes. As an aside, the resulting code is also randomly distributed. Also, any stabilizer of size 2 has (2 01) different generating sets, so we have also found the total number of stabilizers codes of this size.
Similarly, each Si is chosen from the 2 2n0(i01) Pauli matrices commuting with S 1 ; . . . ; S i01 but not from the multiplicative group generated by them, so there are 2 2n0(i01) 0 2 i01 choices. Thus, there are 5 n0k01 a=0 (2 2n0a 02 a ) distinct generating sets. Now, for an arbitrary and fixed list E 0 ; . . . ; E L of independent errors, how many choices of stabilizer generators will give a code with fE y 0 Ejg 2 N(S)8j=1; . . . ; L? This counting is similar to the above, but now S 1 ; S 2 . . . S n0k are constrained to commute with fE y 0 E j g, in addition to the two original constraints. In other words, S 1 can be chosen from the 2 2n0L 01 nontrivial Pauli operators commuting with the E y 0 E j , and S 2 has 2 2n0L+1 0 2 choices, and so on. Thus, there are 5 n0k01 a=0 (2 2n0L0a 02 a ) sets of stabilizer generators that commute with all of E y 0 Ej.
Putting together with the two stabilizer counts, one unconstrained and the other with the same syndrome for fE j g j=0;...;L , the latter has probability 5 n0k01 a=0 (2 2n0L0a 02 a ) 5 n0k01 a=0 (2 2n0a 02 a ) 2 0L(n0k) :
(3)
For step (2), we apply the union bound for the choice of the L+1 E j 's. The probability that a random [n; k] code is not L-list decodable is less than ( NE L + 1 )2 0L(n0k) , which is no more than N L+1 E 2 0L(n0k) . The latter is less than 1 if k < n0(1+ 1 L ) log NE. But N E = jE pn j = bnpc r=0 3 r ( n r ). For any > 0; 9n s.t. whenever n n ; log NE n(H(p)+p log 3+=3) so choosing k = n[10(1+ 1 L )(H(p)+plog 3)02=3] finishes the proof.
IV. CODING STRATEGY
Theorem 3 tells us that for any R < 10H(p)0plog 3, there exist [n; Rn; pn; L]-list codes for large enough n and L. For example, we can choose the various parameters as = 10H(p)0p log 30R; L 3 (H(p)+log 3), and n n in Theorem 3). Note that L does not grow with n.
We now fix such a list-code, C n;L . This always returns a syndrome f . Note that list-decoding removes all superposition between errors with different syndromes. Also, no approximation has been made so far. Now we add a few more stabilizer generators to C n;L so that with high probability (over the choice of the extra generators) the receiver can decode j i unambiguously. These generators are determined by a secret key shared by the sender and receiver, making them unknown to the adversary.
It will follow from the proof of Theorem 4 below that adding (1=log(4=3))(2L + log(1=)) random generators to the code C n;L would allow us to distinguish among the fQ s f g 2 j=1 possible errors, with probability at least 10. This would require 2n(2L+log(1=))=log(4=3) bits of shared key.
A much smaller key can be used if small-biased sets are used to choose these extra stabilizers pseudorandomly [32] , [33] . A subset of f0; 1g m , denoted A, is said to be an -biased set of length m if for each e 2 f0;1g m , roughly half of the elements of A have odd/even parity with e, or mathematically, j Pra2A(e1a = 0)0Pra2A(e1a = 1)j .
There are efficient constructions of -biased sets of length m with only O( m ) elements [32] , [33] . Let G 0 be the set of stabilizer generators of C n;L . We add K extra stabilizer generators T 1 ; . . . ; T K . When j of these have been added, denote the code by C n;L j , with k0j encoded qubits and generator set Gj . (Each C n;L j is a subcode of C n;L j01 .) The next generator Tj+1 has to commute with all of G j but not be generated by it, thus, it is an encoded operation on the code C n;L j . Without loss of generality, it is an encoded Pauli operation on the encoded k0j qubits, and can be chosen according to a random element of an -biased set A j+1 of length 2(k0j). The following theorem shows that using this procedure to add K = O(L log 1=) stabilizers allows the receiver to reconstruct the encoded state with high probability. Using the efficient constructions of -biased sets of length m 2n with only O( n ) elements, our construction requires O((2L + log(1=)) log(n 2 =)) bits of key.
Theorem 4: Let C n;L be an [n; Rn; pn; L]-list code of rate R and let C n;L K be the code obtained from C n;L by progressively adding K = (1= log(4=3))(2L + log(1=)) stabilizers determined by -biased sets A1; . . . ; AK (of decreasing length) as described above. By using a secret key of fewer than O(K(log( n ))) bits to select C n;L K ; nR 0 K = n(R 0 o(n)) qubits can be sent over N adv p;n with fidelity at least 1 0 
where s = 1 K Pr(F ) k2F D s k (N s (j k ih k j)) is the state conditional on the key failing to distinguish the list elements properly. We will now show that Pr(Fs) can be made less than for all lists of length 2 L by choosing K as in the theorem. This results in a decoding fidelity of at least 1 0 . Now fix f; f 0 and define the events Mj as f!(Q s f ; Tj ) = !(Q s f ; T j )g. Then, the probability, over the choices of T 1;...;K , that they assign the same syndrome to Q s f and Q s f is Pr(\ K j=1 M j ) = K j=1 Pr(M j jM j01 . . . M 1 ). Since each T j is chosen using an -biased string of encoded operations of the code C n;L j01 , we have Pr(Mj jMj01 . . . M1) 1+ 2 , which immediately implies that Pr(\ K j=1 M j ) ( 1+ 2 ) K . By a union bound over the choice of f; f 0 , the probability of any pair having the same commutation relations for all j is less than 2 2L ( 1+ Note that can be made to vanish exponentially with n without incurring extra n-dependence on the key size.
In Theorem 4, the extra generators can distinguish the worst case N s and no union bound over s is needed. Furthermore, the additional stabilizers do not depend on s. It means that the final construction is a single quantum error correcting code depending only on a small key. It also means that it is not necessary to first perform list-decoding before selecting the extra stabilizers. The combined decoding operation is independent of s but concludes the error based on the joint inputs of s and the extra syndrome bits (one possible way of which is to first output a list based on s).
V. DISCUSSION
We have introduced the adversarial quantum channel and shown that using a logarithmic length secret key one can communicate over this channel with a rate of 10H(p)0p log 3. This is far higher than would be naively expected from existing QECC's, and quite close to the best known rates for independent depolarizing channels of error probability p. Our construction involves quantum list codes, which we defined and showed to exist with favorable parameters. Classical list decoding has recently played an important role in several complexity theoretic results (for a review, see [35] ), and we expect quantum list codes will be similarly useful in the context of quantum complexity theory.
The scenario considered in this paper and the spirit of our protocols are closely related to those of [27] . Comparing their result with ours points to interesting open questions. Reference [27] constructed approximate quantum error correcting codes of length n capable of correcting up to (n 0 1)=2 errors with high probability (compared to at most n=4 correctable errors for an exact code). Thus, the fraction of errors that can be tolerated in [27] approaches 1=2 as n gets large, which is much higher than in our scheme. Furthermore, unlike our scheme, no secret key is required. Instead, randomizing parameters are sent as part of the message via carefully constructed secret sharing schemes. However, the alphabet size of the codes in [27] grows as a function of both the blocklength and the code's accuracy which severely limits the transmission rate. Also, when their large dimensional channel is viewed as a block of qubit channels, the adversary considered in [27] is much more restricted than ours, being limited to the corruption of contiguous blocks of qubits.
Altogether, there is a general open question on the tradeoff between distance, rate, and key required for a code. More specifically, it is an interesting question whether there are qubit approximate QECCs which achieve the rates of our codes without using a secret key, or, less ambitiously, one with constant size. We have also left unanswered the capacity of N adv p;n assisted by a negligible length secret key. It seems plausible that the capacity is equal to that of the depolarizing channel with error rate p, which would be in analogy with the classical result of [17] . While the capacity of for the depolarizing channel is an open question, one may find codes for N adv p;n with rates matching the best known for the depolarizing channel. It will also be interesting to consider other side resources such as a negligible amount of entanglement. Finally, unlike DMC's, it is unclear for adversarial channels whether the capacity can be improved with a small number of uses of noiseless quantum channels.
As a side remark, our scheme uses the secret key as a randomizing parameter that is inaccessible to the adversary. Since the adversary must corrupt the transmitted state before it is received by Bob, if Bob is allowed to send a "receipt" of the quantum states to Alice, she can simply disclose the random code afterwards and no key is required. In other words, one bit of back communication along with logarithmic forward classical communication (all authenticated) can replace the key requirement.
As another side remark, as the channel can be used to create entanglement, the key used in the communication can be replenished by sending a negligible number of EPR pairs (without affecting the communication rate). Thus the key requirement is only catalytic.
Our result also finds application to a related problem-entanglement distillation with bounded weight errors. In this problem, a state is already distributed between Alice and Bob, so the adversary has already acted and randomizing parameters can be sent in public without a receipt. In [36] , it was shown that n noisy EPR pairs with errors of weight up to pn could be purified to n(10H(p)0plog 3) perfect EPR pairs by a two-way distillation procedure. Our construction lets us distill high fidelity EPR pairs at the same rate with only forward classical communication. In fact, it was suggested in [36] that quantum list codes could be used to reduce the computational complexity of their protocols-almost exactly the approach taken here, though in our case with an eye toward reducing the communication required. The question of efficent encoding and decoding via list codes has not yet been resolved.
It may also be interesting to consider how restricting the computational power of our adversary affects the channel's capacity, which is another topic we leave to future work. The investigation of other restrictions (such as causality of the adversarial channel) is also natural in certain situations and may lead to additional insights.
